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Chakraborty [Journal of Economic Theory, 2004] introduces endogenous
mortality in a two period overlapping generations model by postulating that
the probability of surviving from the ﬁrst period to the second depends on tax-
funded public health. His central result on the existence of multiple steady
states (including development traps) summarized in Proposition 1 is incorrect.
This paper presents the correct proposition and its proof, and in the process,
uncovers several new, interesting results. Contrary to Chakraborty’s analysis,
high mortality yet high capital nations may not be able to escape the poverty
trap. Interestingly, TFP growth can help economies escape the vicious cycle
of poverty.
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11 Introduction
A question that continues to intrigue macroeconomists and policymakers alike is this:
Why is Africa so diﬀerent from the rest of the world?1 Indeed, in a recent speech,
Alan Greenspan2 touches on this question: “While, from a global perspective, wealth
and the overall quality of life have risen, that success has not been evenly distributed
across regions or countries. The economies of East Asia are often-repeated success
stories. Some, including China, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, stand out
not only as growing very strongly, but also as having seen the greatest declines in
poverty rates. ....But, sadly, the story in Africa has been quite diﬀerent. Levels of per
capita income in that continent have actually fallen. The poverty rate, which in 1970
matched the rate in Asia at the time, is estimated to have doubled to 40 percent
by 1998.” In fact, as Haber, North, and Weingast (2003) point out, two-thirds of
African countries have either stagnated or shrunk in real per capita terms since the
onset of independence in the early 1960s.
Easterly and Levine [1997] were among the ﬁrst to pose this question; to them, the
high ethnic fractionalization in the “dark continent” largely explains Africa’s woes.
In a fairly inﬂuential recent paper “Endogenous Lifetime and Economic Growth”,
Chakraborty [2004] indirectly revisits this question by exploring a new connection
between pervasive ill-health and economic growth. As he points out, the probability
that a average 15-year old would die before reaching age 60, was three times as high
in sub-Saharan Africa as in the richer OECD economies. He goes on to suggest that
when life expectancy is low, agents would place little emphasis on the future, and
hence, would invest little in productive long-term assets, thereby getting stuck in
a low level of real activity. In turn, poor health is largely explained by low public
health spending which in turn is a direct outcome of the low level of real activity. In
short, Africa is caught in a development trap induced by poor health.
More speciﬁcally, Chakraborty introduces endogenous mortality in an otherwise
standard overlapping generations model with production of the classic Diamond
[1965] variety. In particular, the probability with which young agents survive on to
the second period depends on public health expenditures which are in turn funded
by income taxes on labor income. The main result in Chakraborty [2004] contained
in his Proposition 1 states that when the output elasticity of capital is high a devel-
opment trap appears and countries diﬀering in health and/or physical capital may
1In the parlance of modern growth theory, this is often summarized as the puzzle of the persistent
negative “Africa dummy” in cross-country growth studies.
2Remarks by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan at Banco de Mexico’s Second Inter-
national Conference "Macroeconomic Stability, Financial Markets, and Economic Development,"
Mexico City, Mexico, November 12, 2002.
2not converge to similar living standards. It is important to note that such poverty
traps do not arise in the standard Diamond model without the aid of several strong
assumptions on preferences and technology that Chakraborty does not make.3
In this paper, we point out a crucial error in his statement of Proposition 1. We
go on to correct the omission and in the process we uncover several new, interesting
results. Contrary to his analysis, it turns out that high mortality nations even if
they have high levels of capital may not be able to escape the poverty trap. This
implies that the vicious cycle of poverty is far more persistent than what his analysis
suggests. In addition, we show that the level of technological development plays
a crucial role in determining the persistence of the development trap. First, when
technological development increases, a new long run equilibrium with higher real
activity and reduced mortality appears. Second, this increase in technical eﬃciency
drastically reduces the level of capital required to escape the development trap. Our
results therefore suggest that high mortality and low capital nations can escape the
low activity trap by raising their TFP.
2 The Model
We use the exact model outlined in Chakraborty [2004]. Here, young agents are born
each period and inelastically supply one unit of labor, earning a wage w. The prob-
ability of a young agent surviving to the next period is given by the non-decreasing
concave function φt ≡ φ(ht), where ht denotes her health capital. We assume that
φ(0) = 0, limh→∞ φ(h)=β ≤ 1 and limh→0 φ(h)=γ<∞. Public health expendi-
ture in period t is ﬁnanced through a proportional tax τt ∈ (0,1) such that ht = τtwt.
At the end of each period, the young agents deposit their savings in a mutual fund,
which earns a gross return on its investments of Rt+1, thus guaranteeing a gross re-
turn of ˆ Rt+1 = Rt+1/φt for the surviving old. The young agents born in period t+1
are not aﬀected by the health capital of the previous generation.
Ap e r s o nb o r ni np e r i o dt maximizes her expected lifetime utility
Ut =l nc
t
t + φt lnc
t
t+1,
subject to the budget constraints
c
t
t ≤ (1 − τt)wt − zt,c
t
t+1 ≤ ˆ Rt+1zt.
Optimal savings takes the form zt =( 1− τt)σtwt, where σt ≡
φt
1+φt.
3See the discussion in Azariadis (2004).
3Final goods are produced using a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy F (K,L)=AKαL1−α, where A>0 and α ∈ (0,1). Perfect competition ensures
that wt =( 1− α)Akα
t and Rt =1+αAk
α−1
t − δ, where k is the capital-labor ratio
and δ is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
In the model set up above, using zt = kt+1, it follows that the general equilibrium
law of motion for the capital-labor ratio is given by
kt+1 =( 1− τ)(1 − α)σ(kt)Ak
α
t , (1)
given k0 > 0 and h = τw(k)=τA(1 − α)kα. We are now ready to re-state Propo-
sition 1 of Chakraborty [2004].
3R e s u l t s
Before we proceed to make corrections, we restate his Proposition 1. (i) below.
Chakraborty’s Proposition 1. (i). The dynamic system described by (1) [his
equation (10)] possesses two steady states {0,¯ k} when α<1/2, only the positive one





¯ k2 > ¯ k1; the two extreme steady states are asymptotically stable, the intermediate one
is not.
By means of a simple counterexample, it is easy to demonstrate that the second
part of this result is incorrectly stated. Suppose A =5 ,α=0 .55,β=0 .5,τ=0 .2,
and φ(h)=βh/(1+h), a functional form for φ(h) that satisﬁes all of Chakraborty’s
assumptions on φ (as stated by him in his footnote 4). Then, it is easy to check that
there exists a unique steady state, k =0 .
 







  J(k) 
45
0 
Figure 1: J(k) versus k
4As Figure 1 illustrates, the error appears because Chakraborty ignores the pos-
sibility that (1) may forever lie below the 45o line thereby producing only the trivial
steady state, k =0 . To see this, deﬁne J(k) to be the right hand side of (1). Then, as
proven in Lemma A.1 (Appendix A), J(0) = 0,J 0(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ≥ 0, limk→∞J(k)/k < 1
and lim
k→0
J0(k)=0if α>1/2. In other words, the J locus starts at 0, is non-decreasing,
and eventually falls below the 45o line; additionally, the 0 steady state is locally sta-
ble. From this Chakraborty erroneously concludes that the J locus “intersects the
45o line from below at least once before falling below it.” Indeed as we demonstrate
below, α>1/2 is simply necessary but not suﬃcient for three steady states to exist.
Since the ﬁrst part of the proposition (the case of α<1/2) is correct, henceforth
we will focus our discussion only on the second part (the case of α>1/2).
The correct statement should read:
Proposition 1. (i). Suppose α>1/2 and suppose k∗ =a r g m a x ( J (k) − k)





with ¯ k2 > ¯ k1; the two extreme steady states are asymptotically





, where ¯ k1 is neither a repellor nor an attractor.
It turns out that even with the speciﬁca s s u m p t i o n st h a tC h a k r a b o r t ym a k e s , it
is not possible to write down necessary and suﬃcient parametric conditions under
which J(k∗) >k ∗. H o w e v e rw ec a np r o v i d eas u ﬃcient condition under which there
exists a ˆ k such that J(ˆ k) > ˆ k, implying the presence of at least three steady states.
This suﬃcient condition is provided in the corollary below, and the proof is in the
appendix.















¯ k2 > ¯ k1; the two extreme steady states are asymptotically stable, the intermediate
o n ei sn o t .
This corollary provides a condition which is easy to check for a given φ function
and set of parameters. For example, if φ = β h
1+h and for the parameter values
4Note that Chakraborty [2004] ignores the possibility that there might be more than 3 steady
states. Without specifying the φ function precisely, it is not possible to determine the maximum
number of steady states.
5provided above, namely α =0 .55,β=0 .5 and τ =0 .2, condition (2) becomes
A>10.3. Setting A =1 5 , this example provides three steady states 0, ¯ k1 =2 .456 ×








is always strictly greater than 0.
W h i l ei ti so n l yp o s s i b l et op r o v i d eas u ﬃcient condition under which there are at
least three steady states in the general case, it is possible to provide a complete char-
acterization of conditions under which (1) would admit at least three steady states
for the special functional form for φ(.) mentioned in Chakraborty [2004] footnote 4.
This characterization is provided in the corollary below. The proof of the corollary
is relegated to the appendix.














>τ(1 + β) (3)




with ¯ k2 > ¯ k1; the two extreme steady states are asymptotically stable, the interme-
diate one is not.
Notice that while (3) reveals that α>1/2 is necessary for the result to hold,
since the left hand side of (3) is negative if α<1/2, clearly α>1/2 is not suﬃcient;
for example, a suﬃciently high value for A is needed.
In light of the amended proposition, some changes to the discussion on page 124
in Chakraborty [2004] are in order. While it is true that a poverty and ill-health
trap exists for α>1/2, it is no longer given that it is possible to escape this trap if a
country starts out with a high enough capital stock. In fact, as equation (3) reveals,
unless there is a suﬃciently high level of technological development (high enough A),
the zero capital poverty trap is the only steady state, and it is stable.
Chakraborty limits his discussion of the implications of increasing A to the case
where α<1/2. Our analysis reveals signiﬁcant new beneﬁt so fd o i n gs oe v e nw h e n
α>1/2 obtains. For general φ, it is easy to verify that ∂J (k)/∂A > 0. The
implication, as depicted in Figure 2, is strong. Consider two countries identical in all
r e s p e c t se x c e p tt h a tc o u n t r yM has a higher A than country N.I ns u c has e t t i n g ,i t
is possible that country N is forever caught in the poverty trap (the only equilibrium)
while country M seizes the potential to approach a high long run level of real activity
(an equilibrium unavailable to country N). This situation corresponds to countries
N and M having A = A0 and A = A1 respectively in Figure 2. Perhaps more





6decreases the intermediate steady state, ¯ k1, and this lowers the initial capital stock
required to escape the twin traps of poverty and ill-health! This last beneﬁti si n
addition to the increase in ¯ k2, a point discussed by Chakraborty. These last two
eﬀects are illustrated in Figure 2 as a country increases A from A1 to A2.
 
A = A0 
A0 < A1 < A2 
A = A2 
A = A1 
k 
J(k) 
Figure 2: J(k) versus k for α>1
2 and diﬀerent values of A.
7A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1. (i).






and note that w(ˆ k)=1 .W e w i s h t o p r o v e t h a t J(ˆ k) > ˆ k.







































which is exactly condition (2). ¥
A.2 Proof of Corollary to Proposition 1. (ii).
Proof: Rewrite J(k) as J(k)=( 1−τ)σ(k)w(k). Then steady states are ﬁxed points











+ τ (1 + β)
¸
and ﬁnally to H(k)=c where


















H(k)=0 . It remains to identify conditions under
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